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Abstract
Financial crises are often presented as triggers for important innovations in international regulation of financial markets, but
existing evidence for this claim primarily derive from the analyses of individual initiatives, assessed against noncomparable
benchmarks. In order to provide systematic evidence of financial crises’ impact on international financial regulatory change,
this paper develops a novel text-as-data approach to measure regulatory novelty. We use this approach to analyze the full pop-
ulation of international banking and securities standards between 1975 and 2016. Contrary to theoretical expectations, our
empirical findings indicate rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises are on
average as likely to build on existing international regulations as those designed before a crisis. We also find that international
banking rules published after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an important exception.
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1. Introduction
Financial crises have long been recognized within the political economy literature as important catalysts for eco-
nomic policy reforms at the national and international levels. Over the years numerous studies have theorized
how crises alter the political economy in ways that enable economic reforms; for instance, a crisis may weaken
powerful opponents to regulation or provide a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to promote regu-
latory change. Paradoxically, while existing studies find that financial crises trigger policy reforms in areas as
diverse as macroeconomic adjustments (Walter 2013; Frieden 2015), capital account liberalization (Pep-
insky 2012), and trade policy (Ballard-Rosa et al. 2018), there exists scholarly disagreement about the effect of
financial crises on one of the policy areas more directly related to these events: the design of financial regulatory
policies.
Scholarship documents that it is often in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis (rather than before)
when financial reforms are more likely to be introduced both at the domestic level, as well as at the international
level (within international standard-setting bodies). Although high-profile international regulatory reforms such as
the Basel Agreement are known responses to the crisis, scholars vary in their evaluations of to what extent interna-
tional financial reforms negotiated in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis mark breaks from past policies
or, rather, incrementally build upon them. For instance, a few studies emphasize that the 2008 global financial crisis
(GFC) led to novel international reforms to regulate global financial markets (Pagliari 2012; Baker 2013; Wilf 2016).
In contrast, other works highlight the incremental nature of many reforms (Moschella & Tsingou 2013) and con-
clude that the crisis led to largely “status quo” – rather than novel – policies (Helleiner 2014).
The persistent disagreements among scholars regarding the nature of international regulatory change after
financial crises are often amplified by two common research design characteristics. First, insights about interna-
tional financial regulations often analyze one, or a few, rules. It is often unclear how to aggregate findings across
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individual studies. Second, existing studies often assess regulatory change against benchmarks that are not readily
comparable to the regulatory initiatives. As a result, it is often difficult to generally characterize the regulatory
response and to evaluate the general effect of the financial crisis on the agenda of international standard-setting
bodies.
This paper takes a different approach. Rather than focusing on one specific international regulatory initiative,
this paper analyses the full population of international financial standards from two of the oldest and most signif-
icant international standard-setting bodies – the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) – from 1975 through 2016. We use quantitative text
analysis to develop a data-driven, quantitative measure of the regulatory novelty of the rules issued by these two
international standard-setting bodies across-time. Using the textual similarity of each new international rule com-
pared to all rules previously published by the same regulatory authority, we measure the extent to which each
new international financial regulatory initiative builds upon or departs from, existing initiatives.1 Regulatory ini-
tiatives that build upon existing regulations have relatively similar word patterns to one or more existing regula-
tions; in contrast, rules that regulate new areas of the financial sector, or that introduce new regulatory
approaches, have word patterns that are less similar to all existing regulations.
When we statistically test the hypothesis that post-crisis periods are moments when international standard-
setting bodies adopt particularly novel regulatory approaches, two main findings emerge. First, in contrast to our
theoretical expectation, rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises
often have a regulatory novelty that is not higher, on average, than for international rules written before financial
crises. Said differently, in the aftermath of a crisis, international standard-setting bodies are often as likely to build
on and adapt existing international regulations as they are in the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with authors
who emphasize that international financial regulatory policymaking is often incremental in nature. Second, inter-
national banking rules published after the GFC are an important exception. Following the 2008 crisis, new inter-
national banking standards designed by the Basel Committee display especially high levels of novel content as
compared to the agenda adopted by this body before the crisis. Together, our basic theoretical expectation that
major financial crises are major breaking point in the agenda of international standard-setting bodies and lead to
especially high levels of novelty in their rule-making does not generally and empirically hold.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature and current debates about the connection
between financial crises and international financial regulatory change. It explains how scholarly insights have
been limited by a lack of comparable indicators across reforms. Section 3 outlines our approach to measure regu-
latory change after a crisis. Section 4 analyzes the international banking and securities standards that have been
negotiated in the aftermath of the late 1990s’ Asian Financial Crisis and the late 2000s’ Global Financial Crisis.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion and further implications.
2. Financial crises and international regulatory change
2.1. Theoretical insights
Scholarship often characterizes financial market regulation as a policy domain with high barriers to change.
Financial regulatory policies often impose concentrated, observable costs on regulated firms. Therefore, during
normal times, policymakers seeking to strengthen regulations typically face opposition from powerful, vested
interests that seek to limit the regulatory burden of new rules, and includes financial firms (Lall 2012;
Young 2013) and other, non-financial groups (Pagliari & Young 2014). Although regulatory changes that correct
market failures may be supported by the public at large (Chaudoin & Wilf 2019; Young & Yagci 2019), the tech-
nical complexity of the issue and the collective action problems associated with regulating finance means that the
public rarely mobilizes to demand financial regulations. As a result, policymakers’ efforts to challenge regulatory
opposition are unlikely to be rewarded during normal times (Aizenman 2009).
Financial crises are often identified within this literature as moments when obstacles to regulatory change are
most likely to be overcome. First, major financial crises have often the effect of revealing limitations of existing
regulatory policies and may create windows of opportunities for norm entrepreneurs to promote new regulatory
ideas and approaches (Baker 2013). Second, financial crises are moments where the standard equilibrium – of
high mobilization against and low mobilization in favor of, regulation – is most likely to be interrupted. During
© 2020 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd2
S. Pagliari, and M. Wilf Regulatory novelty after fin. crises
financial crises, the costs of the failure of regulatory policies to keep up with financial sector innovation become
clear to the general public. As the financial regulatory policy gains salience, policymakers face domestic pressure
to initiate new regulatory initiatives from voters as well as from groups normally not engaged in this policy
domain (Oatley & Nabors 1998; Singer 2007; Pagliari & Young 2016). Simultaneously, the political capital of the
financial industry and its capacity to oppose regulatory changes are often challenged in the aftermath of crises
(Young 2013).
Moreover, in an era of increasingly mobile capital, unilateral regulatory responses create a regulator’s
dilemma, where increased regulatory stringency will increase financial stability but competitively disadvantage
domestic financial firms vis-a-vis foreign firms (Kapstein 1989). As a result, after a crisis, national regulators who
face national pressures to increase regulatory stringency have more incentives to coordinate regulatory responses
with foreign counterparts in order to level the international playing field (Kapstein 1989; Oatley & Nabors 1998;
Singer 2007). For instance, the BCBS has emerged as the primary site to coordinate banking regulations in
response to the return of international banking crises in the aftermath of the end of the Bretton Woods exchange
rate system (Kapstein 1989; Goodhart 2011). This was followed by the creation of other standard-setting bodies
such as the IOSCO coordinating securities regulations, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
coordinating best practices among insurance supervisors, and the International Accounting Standards Board
coordinating national accounting standard-setting bodies (Singer 2007; Buthe & Mattli 2011).
2.2. Empirical limitations
Although financial crises are commonly understood as the most likely triggers for important expansions in the
agenda of international standard-setting bodies such as the BCBS and IOSCO, the extent to which new rules will
break new ground and depart from existing ones remains elusive. Empirical works on this topic–those that inves-
tigate the impact of crises on international regulatory reforms–have reached vastly different conclusions. Some
empirical works find that financial instability results in a major international organization and international rule
changes. For instance, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord that harmonizes minimum capital requirements for interna-
tionally active banks emerged out of national and international political dynamics triggered by the Latin Ameri-
can debt crisis (Oatley & Nabors 1998). Other studies, instead, emphasize that not every crisis is followed by
major reform. For instance, Singer’s (2007) detail show the 1987 US stock market crash highlighted the intercon-
nectedness of securities markets but failed to generate an international securities agreement comparable to the
Basel Capital Accord for international banks.
Moreover, within related literature that analyzes the character (rather than causes) of post-crisis international
regulatory reforms, significant disagreement remains. For instance, while some scholars have described the East
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 as a turning point in international financial regulation given the expansion in
the scope of regulatory cooperation to cover new sectors (Walter 2008), other scholars have argued that the set of
changes represented only “modest” change compared to the extent of the crisis (Soederberg 2003, p. 391).
And, similar disagreements exist about how to interpret the wave of international financial regulatory reforms
negotiated in the aftermath of the 2008 GFC. The scale of the GFC that began in 2007 had no equivalent in the
post-Bretton Woods era. For some, the crisis led to the creation of important new regulatory initiatives, the emer-
gence of innovative regulatory approaches, and, more broadly, marked a significant turning point in the interna-
tional regulatory architecture (Pagliari 2012; Baker 2013; Wilf 2016). Others, instead, describe regulatory changes
triggered by the crisis as, at best, tweaking the pre-crisis international financial architecture without challenging
the existing policy paradigm (Moschella & Tsingou 2013; Helleiner 2014; Fioretos 2016).
Two traits of many existing analyses help explain scholars’ vastly different conclusions about how to charac-
terize post-crisis international regulatory reforms. First, most studies either analyze one reform or compare a few
reforms. Early scholarship on international financial regulation focused on the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and uti-
lized in-depth case studies (Kapstein 1989; Oatley & Nabors 1998). A small-n approach remains dominant, even
though the number and scope of international regulations have greatly expanded throughout the 1990s and
beyond. Many studies of the regulatory response to the 2008 GFC analyze one or few selected initiatives such as
measures introduced after the crisis to regulate hedge funds (Helleiner & Pagliari 2009), derivatives
(Knaack 2015), resolution regimes for too-big-to-fail financial institutions (Quaglia 2017), and shadow banking
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(Ban et al. 2016). This focus has the advantage of providing an in-depth understanding of the nature and deter-
minants of individual initiatives. However, given the large number and diversity of existing international regula-
tory initiatives that have emerged in recent years, it has become more difficult to generalize findings or
assessments of the overall character of international regulatory reforms from individual studies.
Second, a variety of benchmarks are used to evaluate international regulatory change. Take, for instance, the
Basel III banking standards, which are arguably the linchpin post-GFC efforts to increase the stability of interna-
tional banks. Some scholars argue that Basel III was a success. Drezner points to the relatively short negotiation
time of Basel III (2 years) compared to the previous Basel II (6 years) (Drezner 2013), and Wilf (2016) provides
stock price evidence that equity investors perceived Basel III to increase regulatory stringency. For other scholars,
Basel III was a limited response. Lall (2012, p. 609) argues that international regulators moved “from failure to
failure,” and Admati and Hellwig (2013), p. 180) argue that Basel III minimums, although an increase from previ-
ous standards, remain “outrageously low.” As a result, attempts to evaluate the nature of post-crisis international
reforms rely mostly on very different benchmarks that are often not readily comparable across regulatory
initiatives.
In sum, while a large literature has identified financial crises as the most likely catalyst for competing bench-
marks that cannot be applied across different reforms. How can we assess the overall impact of crises over inter-
national regulatory change? The next section outlines a unique, data-driven approach to analyze international
regulatory change that will be used to test the main hypothesis that post-crisis periods are moments when inter-
national standard-setting bodies adopt novel regulatory approaches.
3. A text-based measure of regulatory novelty
This section describes how we conceptualize and measure international financial regulatory change. Two aspects
distinguish our approach from existing studies. First, in contrast with analyses of one or a few individual reforms,
our approach includes the entire population of rules designed by two important international standard-setting
bodies. This provides a bird’s-eye view of patterns of regulatory change. Second, we use quantitative text analysis
to arrive at an objective, data-driven measure of the regulatory novelty of each rule within the population.
3.1. Regulatory novelty: Conceptual definition
To explore regulatory change across a range of financial sector actors and rules, we need a suitable measure. Exis-
ting literature commonly evaluates post-crisis regulatory reforms against a set of subjective expectations about
what regulatory outcomes could have been expected. For instance, Moschella and Tsingou (2013, p. 2) argue that
“the process of international financial reform has fallen short of initial (and proclaimed) expectations of rapid
and revolutionary transformation.” However, because both the root cause of the crisis and the expected regulatory
response is often highly contested, it is often unclear what should be the appropriate baseline.
In this paper, we compare the content of each new international regulation against all regulations previously
written by the same international standard-setting body. Such an approach is relational and lies in contrast to a
researcher defining a specific regulatory outcome that should have been expected. By comparing a rule with all
past rules by the same standard-setter, we aim to measure the level of “regulatory novelty” of each standard,
defined as the extent to which a new international regulatory initiative builds upon or departs from previous reg-
ulations. From this perspective, “regulatory novelty” overlaps with the notion of “incrementalism” in policy
change, which captures the extent to which decision-makers respond to new problems by primarily engaging in a
local search for options rather than introducing novel grand designs (Lindblom 1959). The concept is used in the
recent scholarly analysis to describe post-crisis international financial regulatory reforms (Helleiner 2012;
Moschella & Tsingou 2013; Fioretos 2016).
3.2. Measuring regulatory novelty: Operational definition
Existing studies that compare the degree to which new international financial standards depart from previous
ones typically involve in-depth, qualitative analyses of hand-picked pairs of regulatory initiatives, such as compar-
ing Basel II Agreement with its predecessor Basel I (Tarullo 2008), or Basel III with Base II (Lall 2012; Admati &
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Hellwig 2013). This paper’s approach complements case-specific studies by comparing a new standard with the
entire population of previous regulatory initiatives by the same standard-setter. Specifically, we measure “regula-
tory novelty” as the degree to which a new international rule’s text is most similar to previously published rules
by the same international standard-setting body. The main assumption behind this approach is that vocabulary
differences in any two international regulations capture differences in the extent to which they build upon or
depart from each other. Two dimensions are particularly likely to drive differences in the vocabulary used by the
same regulator: the regulatory scope and the regulatory approach. The first dimension captures the specific set of
markets or institutions that are the primary target of regulatory intervention. All else equal, a new regulatory ini-
tiative that targets markets or institutions that have so far remained outside the regulatory perimeter will display
more regulatory novelty than will a regulatory initiative that seeks to revise previous international rules targeted
at the same market actor. For example new international rules targeting for the first time shadow banking institu-
tions or financial benchmarks can be understood to have a greater regulatory novelty that international standards
revise rules surrounding already-regulated institutions such as commercial banks or insurers. The second dimen-
sion of regulatory novelty concerns the type of regulatory instruments adopted. All else equal, a new international
rule that introduces new approaches to regulate a given market or institution is more novel than a regulatory ini-
tiative that simply re-calibrate existing regulatory tools. For example international standards introducing new
tools such as liquidity and leverage requirements to the regulation of internationally active banks can be under-
stood to have greater regulatory novelty than standards tightening or loosening the capital requirements already
imposed upon these institutions.
In both cases, we expect that this novelty will be reflected in the vocabulary used by regulators. For example
the first time that hedge funds or credit rating agencies are regulated, or the first time that liquidity (rather than
capital) requirements for banks are introduced, vocabulary will differ from all other rules; this low similarity with
all existing rules captures high regulatory novelty. In contrast, a new international rule that directly builds upon a
previous international rule, or that incrementally revises an existing standard, will share a high percentage of
meaningful words in common with those relevant, past rules. That is high text similarity, with one or more previ-
ously issued international financial standards is a good proxy for a new regulation that exhibits low regulatory
novelty.
To measure the extent to which the text of a new international initiative is similar to the text of a broad range
of existing rules, we use a text-as-data approach (Grimmer & Stewart 2013) and measure the cosine similarity
across different rules. Cosine similarity is a bag of words approach to text-similarity that collapses the word con-
tent of a document into a vector of wordcounts over m-dimensions, where each dimension represents a specific
word (Mihalcea et al. 2006; Huang 2008). The location and sequence of words do not affect this value. Within
political science, cosine similarity has been recently used to compare document similarity among legislation
(Garrett & Jansa 2015), parliamentary speeches (Martocchia Diodati et al. 2018), and bilateral tax treaties (Arel-
Bundock & Lechner 2018).
This measure is particularly suitable for our analysis for three reasons. First, while “substring matching”
methods such as those employed in plagiarism detection software are better suited to identify cases where new
rules directly reuse text from past rules, our approach allows identifying the topical similarity of two texts written
independently (Wilkerson et al. 2015; James et al. 2020). Second, unlike other “bag of words” approaches such as
Word score that compares the distribution of words against an anchor document (Laver et al. 2003), our
approach to measuring regulatory novelty does not require the researcher to select reference documents to guide
the analysis. Third, cosine similarity provides a standardized measure that is easier to interpret across multiple
documents. Between any two document texts, the measure is bounded between 0 and 1. Two rules with high
cosine similarity (near 1.00) have similar document words and relative word densities, while two rules with low
cosine similarity (near 0.00) have fewer common words and more dissimilar word distributions.2
To measure the regulatory novelty of a given international standard, we want to know how distinct the new
rule is compared to all previous rules by the same standard-setter. We start by identifying a population of inter-
national standards set by a given regulator. For each rule we identify the previous international standard with the
highest cosine similarity that is the standard that shares the most similar word densities with all previously publi-
shed rules by the same regulator. We call this measure “Maximum Cosine Similarity” (MaxSim). A formal
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definition, along with empirical examples that build intuition about the measure’s construction, may be found in
Appendix A.
3.3. Data
We analyze the set of international financial regulations that have been written by the two oldest and most
established international standard-setting bodies. Rules written by the BCBS are the set of international banking
regulations, and rules written by IOSCO are the set of international securities regulations. The unit of analysis is
an international standard, which is a document written and publicly posted by an international standard-setting
body. As defined by the Financial Stability Board, standards may include statements of principles, best practices,
and/or guidelines.
While existing studies of BCBS and IOSCO rules typically focus on selected, high profile regulatory initiatives,
we analyze each group’s entire population of publicly available international financial regulatory standards. We
collect all the documents available on the “publications” page of each organization’s website.3 We coded the sub-
set of publications on each page that constitute international standards; one document is one international stan-
dard.4 The BCBS and IOSCO have incentives to make agreed-upon international standards publicly accessible,
and, where documents have been updated over time, both original and revised versions of documents are avail-
able. This process resulted in a set of 184 BCBS international standards that span the years 1975–2016 and 303
IOSCO international standards that span the years 1989–2016.5
Figure 1 graphs the annual count of new international bank and securities rules. The number of new interna-
tional rules spikes in the aftermath of the financial crisis (the gray areas). This is consistent with both general the-
oretical expectations that post-crisis periods have increased the likelihood of being a period of new regulatory
cooperation (Singer 2007), and conventional wisdom about the post-GFC period, in particular, as one with many
new rules.
Rather than the frequency of new international rules, however, we are interested in the rules’ level of regula-
tory novelty, proxied for by textual similarity. The next section illustrates and validates our approach using this
data from international banking and securities standards.
3.4. Illustration and validation
We use the r package quanteda (Benoit et al. 2018) to compute cosine similarity. We pre-process each text by
stemming and removing punctuation and stop words as defined by quanteda. Our analysis is lexical, such that
1998 00:
Post
Asian
Fin
Crisis
2008 10:
Post
Global
Fin
Crisis
1980 1990 2000 2010
1
9
7
5
2
0
1
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
d
o
cu
m
en
t 
co
u
n
t
year
New Rule Count
International bank rules
(BCBS)
1998 00:
Post
Asian
Fin
Crisis
2008 10:
Post
Global
Fin
Crisis
1980 1990 2000 2010
1
9
7
5
2
0
1
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
d
o
cu
m
en
t 
co
u
n
t
year
New Rule Count
International securities rules
(IOSCO)
Figure 1 The annual count of new banking (left) and securities (right) international standards, 1975–2016.
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synonyms are treated as distinct terms. These decisions are appropriate given the data at hand, which define reg-
ulatory rules and principles; precise terminology is essential, and, should an organization use new terms for exis-
ting concepts, this represents a change in regulatory approach that is of interest.
As an initial check that our measure of regulatory novelty identifies important and expected variation, we
consider a selection of international standards for which qualitative literature indicates the rule is either especially
novel or especially derivative.
Figure 2 displays the full set of cosine similarity values with all other international rules by the same regulator
for two international securities (IOSCO) rules (top row) and two international banks (BCBS) rules (bottom row)
written in the post-GFC period.6 The two graphs to the left are those that the literature identifies as known revi-
sions, and therefore we expect high MaxSim, indicating low regulatory novelty. The two graphs to the right are
those that the literature identifies as novel post-GFC regulations, and therefore we expect low MaxSim, indicating
high regulatory novelty.
The top-left graph of Figure 2 shows the 2008 IOSCO standard concerning credit rating agencies. In this case,
the GFC led international regulatory authorities to closely look at the role of rating agencies, and IOSCO updated
a previous set of recommendations that it had published in 2004 (in orange) in the aftermath of the Enron scan-
dal. The specific regulatory provisions of the 2008 rule–addressing conflict of interests and the poor historical
Figure 2 Identifying Maximum Cosine Similarity among all cosine similarities; examples from two IOSCO (top row) and
two BCBS (bottom row) post-Global Financial Crisis rules. Each graph plots cosine similarity between one international stan-
dard and the text of every other final document by the same regulator. MaxSimi (orange dot) is the highest cosine similarity
among all previously written, pre-crisis rules. Consistent with substantive knowledge that left graphs are known incremental
reforms, and right graphs are known to introduce new regulatory tools, MaxSim for each left graph is higher than for each
right graph.
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performance of rating agencies – did not significantly depart from the 2004 initiative (Pagliari 2012). Consistent
with the literature, the graph shows that MaxSim is very high (0.99 out of 1.00 max) for this rule.
In contrast, the top-right graph of Figure 2 shows a 2013 IOSCO standard concerning “Principles of Financial
Benchmarks.” This international rule tackled a wholly new issue that emerged after it was uncovered, in 2012,
that the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) index had been manipulated (Dao et al. 2016). The highest
cosine similarity to “Principles of Financial Benchmarks” is a loosely related 2012 set of “Principles for Oil
Reporting Agencies” (in orange). As such, MaxSim is relatively low for this standard (0.44), consistent with sub-
stantive knowledge. The important comparison is that the known IOSCO rule revision (regarding credit rating
agencies) has a relatively low measure of regulatory novelty and the known IOSCO regulatory expansion (regard-
ing financial benchmarks) has a relatively high measure of regulatory novelty.
The bottom-left graph of Figure 2 displays a cosine similarity between Basel III and all other BCBS interna-
tional rules. Basel III sets minimum capital regulations for internationally active banks and directly builds upon
its predecessor agreement, Basel II (Wilf 2016).7 Thus, not surprisingly, the MaxSim is relatively high for Basel
III (0.81).
Finally, the bottom-right graph of Figure 2 displays cosine similarity between Globally Systemically Important
Bank (G-SIB) capital charges – a 2011 regulation on the largest international banks – and every other BCBS
international rule. The G-SIB rule is the BCBS’s main post-GFC regulatory attempt to deal with too-big-to-fail
banks; the BCBS required especially large, “systemically important” financial institutions to hold additional regu-
latory capital. Consistent with substantive knowledge that this is a new regulatory tool that expanded upon exis-
ting approaches to bank regulation (Helleiner 2014), the standard has are latively low level of MaxSim (0.69)
with all previous rules, indicating relatively high regulatory novelty. The important comparison is that the known
BCBS rule revision (Basel III) has a relatively low measure of regulatory novelty, and the known BCBS regulatory
expansion (regarding systemically important banks) has a relatively high measure of regulatory novelty.
We additionally validate our measure of novelty by comparing levels of MaxSim among documents that are
and are not known revisions of previous documents. Figure B1 shows the distribution of MaxSim for documents
that are known revisions of previous documents (dark black, solid line) as compared to non-revision documents
(light black, dotted line). Mean MaxSim of international rules known to be revisions is nearly one (indicating
lower levels of novelty), while non-revision documents have lower average levels of MaxSim (indicating higher
levels of novelty).
3.5. Limitations
Although the above approach provides a new perspective to evaluate regulatory change, it is important to note
that this paper’s focus on regulatory vocabulary is unlikely to map onto certain dimensions of regulatory change
discussed within the existing literature.
First, our measure observes and analyzes the extent to which the text of new standards builds upon or depart
from existing published initiatives; in doing so, it focuses uniquely on what is on the books and takes this
observed data as given. One limitation of this focus is that proposed rules that did not become an international
standard because of the lack of agreement among regulatory authorities (Kapstein 1989; Singer 2007) remain
invisible to the project. In addition, unwritten norms and informal conventions could theoretically substitute for
regulatory text. This blind spot could affect the results of the analysis as the formalization of existing conventions
could produce reforms that are only “novel” on paper. Second, the extent to which a new international standard
builds upon or departs from previous rules does not necessarily match the actual impact that this change will
have over market actors (Wilf 2016; Winecoff 2017). For instance, both a regulatory initiative that requires a 10%
minimum international bank capital and a revision of the same standard that doubles the minimum requirement
to 20% would share the most relevant terms but would have a very different impact over the regulated entities.
Moreover, in some cases seemingly small regulatory adjustments may have important unintended, long-term con-
sequences (Moschella & Tsingou 2013; Grabel 2018). Instead of attributing a particular value to each initiative,
our statistical analysis places equal weight on every international standard. This is consistent with the purpose of
our analysis of analyzing the full population of international standards, future research could weight these rules
to differentiate their significance.
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Third, the soft-law nature of international financial standards means that the impact of these standards ulti-
mately depends on the way they are implemented domestically across different jurisdictions (Newman &
Posner 2018). The existing literature highlights how countries often implement the same set of internationally-
agreed commitments after a crisis in very uneven and distinct ways (Walter 2008; Helleiner et al. 2018). Nonethe-
less, an extensive literature details how international financial standards have wide-ranging, empirical effects; they
act as focal point regulations for domestic regulatory reforms in industrialized and emerging markets
(Zaring 1998), influence domestic political battles over the design of regulatory policies (Newman & Posner 2018),
and affect market actors’ valuation of regulated firms (Wilf 2016.
Fourth, by comparing the extent to which the text of new standards build upon or depart from existing publi-
shed initiatives from the same standard-setting body, our approach does not capture instances of forum-shifting,
whereby an issue is moved toward a new standard-setting body (e.g. the establishment of the Financial Stability
Board in the aftermath of the GFC) or policy diffusion whereby a seemingly novel standard is actually copied
from a different standard-setting body.
With these caveats in mind, the next section turns to statistical analysis to test our hypothesis that post-
financial crisis periods are associated with international regulatory change.
4. Correlates of regulatory novelty
Because this study is interested to examine the impact of crises on the overall regulatory agenda of international
standard-setting bodies – rather than the impact of crises on individual regulations – we select crises on the basis
of their real-world significance as well as their importance in the context of the literature on international finan-
cial reforms. In the post-Bretton Woods era, it is possible to identify three main international financial crises,
which directly affected a large significant number of countries: the 1980s debt crisis, the late 1990s’ Asian Finan-
cial Crisis (AFC), and the late 2000s’ GFC. Of these three crises, we omit the 1980s debt crisis because there are
not enough BCBS pre-crisis observations, and IOSCO was established after the 1980s crisis outbreak.8
We use our validated measure of regulatory novelty to analyze whether reforms introduced in the aftermath
of financial crises display especially high degrees of regulatory novelty. Pre-crisis levels of regulatory novelty
become the benchmark against, which to determine whether post-crisis regulatory novelty is especially high
or low.
Figure 3 plots international rules by publication date (x-axis) and MaxSim (y-axis) for international bank reg-
ulators (BCBS, left graph) and international securities regulators (IOSCO, right graph). Rules with relatively high
levels of MaxSim are those that build upon previous rules, while rules with relatively low levels of MaxSim indi-
cate relatively novel rules. Figure 3 shows that BCBS and IOSCO standards widely vary in regulatory novelty. At
many times, including the post-GFC period, new rules are a mix of both incrementally updated, pre-crisis initia-
tives (relatively high MaxSim) and new issues and approaches (relatively lowMaxSim).
4.1. Data and statistical model
We move from descriptive statistics to statistical analysis. The unit of observation is an international standard.
After missing data, a set of 183 BCBS (banking) rules from 1978 to 2016 and 302 IOSCO (securities) rules from
1989 to 2016 compose the dataset.
We operationalize two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is Rule Novelty, measured by
MaxSim (described above). Again, this captures MaxSim between the international standard and all previously
published international rules by a given regulator (BCBS or IOSCO). Because the dependent variable is a continu-
ous value bounded between 0 (low MaxSim/high novelty) and 1 (high MaxSim/low novelty), we use a beta regres-
sion model (Ferrari & Cribari-Neto 2004; Cribari-Neto & Zeileis 2009).9 For ease of interpretation, the
complement value (1-MaxSim) enters into the analysis, such that higher values indicate higher levels of novelty.
A second dependent variable is a Highly Novel Rule, a binary measure that takes the value of 1 when MaxSim
is in the lowest rolling quartile, and 0 otherwise. Observations that take a value of 1, therefore, have especially
low MaxSim (lower than or equal to the first quartile value of all previous rules), indicating a rule that is
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especially unlike existing rules.10 We expect higher levels of the variable Rule Novelty, and a higher likelihood of
a Highly Novel Rule during post-crisis periods.
The explanatory variable of interest is a crisis indicator that takes a value of 1 for years after the initial crisis
outbreak. Baseline analysis uses a four-year post-crisis period, (1998–2001 for the AFC and 2008–2011 for the
GFC). This is a reasonable time in which to observe new rules that emerge in reaction to crisis; in robustness
checks, we show that results are not sensitive to this specific choice. We expect a positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient, which would indicate higher average levels of regulatory novelty in post-crisis periods as com-
pared to each pre-crisis period.
Finally, we control for variables that might affect an international standard’s level of regulatory novelty. We
first add an indicator (Revision Rule Indicator) for new rules that explicitly update or revise a previous regulation.
These are rules that BCBS or IOSCO decide to reconsider and re-write. By definition, such a document is likely
to be similar to the text it revises and, therefore, to have a relatively high MaxSim, indicating low novelty. We
control for document length, which we operationalize as the logged value of total words in a document after
cleaning (Ln(Document word count)). We add a control indicator for co-authored documents (Co-authored docu-
ments); these are co-authored by multiple international standard-setting bodies.11 We are agnostic about the
direction of any effect, but think it plausible that these documents may address a different set of issues, and there-
fore use different languages than, initiatives written solely by the BCBS or solely by IOSCO. Finally, for Rule Nov-
elty estimates, we add a control for the logged count of previous documents with cosine similarity values (Ln
(Previous doc ct)); the greater number of previous final documents that exist when a rule is written, the more
likely there might be one document that a new rule expands upon.12
In regressions of Highly Novel Rule, the dependent variable is based on a rolling MaxSim that implicitly con-
trols for this across-time change. In robustness checks, we show that results are robust too, and are not driven
by, the specific decisions associated with model selection, crisis dates, and post-crisis period lengths.
We estimate the following regression equation to test whether post-crisis periods are associated with higher
levels of regulatory novelty:
Noveltyi = α+ β1 Post Crisis Periodi + β jXij + si ð1Þ
where Noveltyi measures regulatory novelty (either Rule Noveltyi or Highly Novel Rulei) of international rule i,
Post Crisis Periodi is an indicator for an international standard written in post-crisis periods (1998 and after for
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Figure 3 Maximum Cosine Similarity (MaxSim) for BCBS rules (left) and IOSCO rules (right). Each dot is an international
standard, plotted by publication date (x-axis) and its Maximum Cosine Similarity to all previous rules (y-axis).
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AFC, and 2008 and after for GFC), and Xij is a matrix with a set of j control variables, and si is a normally dis-
tributed error term.
4.2. Results
Table 1 reports in the top half of the estimates of regulatory novelty within international banking rules written by
the BCBS (top half) following the GFC (Models (1) and (2)) and following the AFC (Models and (4)). The bot-
tom half reports instead of the same results for international securities rules written by IOSCO following the
GFC (Models (5) and (6)) and following the AFC (Models (7) and (8)). In each set of these four sets, the first
model presents beta regression estimates of the bounded, but a continuous measure of Rule Noveltyi (which takes
values between 0 (low novelty) and 1 (high novelty), and then logistic regression estimates for the binary variable
Highly Novel Rulei (which takes the value of 1 when MaxSim is especially low (such that novelty is espe-
cially high)).
Table 1 Correlates of international regulatory novelty: Dependent variable is, alternatively, Rule Noveltyi, analyzed with beta
regression, or, an indicator for Highly Novel Rulei, analyzed with logistic regression. The explanatory variable of interest is the
post-crisis period
International bank (BCBS) standards
Rule Novelty Highly Novel Rule Rule Novelty Highly Novel Rule
D.V. (beta reg) (logistic reg) (beta reg) (logistic reg)
Regression model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis Period
Post-Global Fin Crisis (2008+) 0.339** (0.140) 1.515** (0.589)
Post-Asian Fin Crisis (1998+) –0.715*** (0.211) –2.384** (0.995)
Controls
Document length (ln) –0.288*** –0.881*** –0.229*** –0.887
Revision doc ind. –0.950*** –1.218* –0.705*** –0.029
Co-authored doc ind. 0.234* 0.319 –0.033 0.482
Previous documents (ln) –0.091 0.278**
Constant 1.928*** 5.707*** 0.680 6.377
Observations 139 129 65 55
Years 1978–2011 1990–2011 1978–2001 1990–2001
Log Likelihood 119.515 –56.596 56.490 –17.298
International securities (IOSCO) standards
Rule Novelty Highly Novel Rule Rule Novelty Highly Novel Rule
D.V. (beta reg) (logistic reg) (beta reg) (logistic reg)
Regression model (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crisis Period
Post-Global Fin Crisis (2008+) –0.109 (0.109) –0.261 (0.556)
Post-Asian Fin Crisis (1998+) 0.126 (0.139) 0.163 (0.899)
Controls
Document length (ln) –0.172*** –0.963*** –0.273*** –1.404***
Revision document ind. –0.980*** –16.471 –1.029*** –17.404
Co-authored doc ind. –0.099 –0.783 0.033 –17.032
Previous documents (ln) –0.181*** –0.349***
Constant 1.697*** 6.538*** 3.035*** 9.113**
Observations 238 228 108 98
Years 1989–2011 1990–2011 1989–2001 1990–2001
Log Likelihood 167.280 –71.374 90.224 –18.286
Significant at <1 percent (***), <5 percent (**), and <10 percent (*).
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The top half of Table 1 indicates that regulatory novelty is especially high for bank rules in the aftermath of
the GFC (as compared to before the crisis), but especially low in the aftermath of the AFC. The post-GFC vari-
able in Models (1) and (2) is positive and statistically significant, indicating that bank rules written in the years
2008 through 2011 – as compared to all bank rules written through 2007 – have higher average levels of Rule
Novelty (Model (1)), and are, on average, more likely to be a Highly Novel Rule (Model (2)). This controls for
characteristics of each rule (document length, and whether it is revised or co-authored), and for Model (1), addi-
tionally controlling for a number of previous rules.
In contrast, however, we found that post-AFC rules did not display higher regulatory novelty than in the pre-
crisis period. The post-AFC variable in Models (3) and (4) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that
bank rules written in the years 1998 through 2001 – as compared to all bank rules written through 1997 – have
lower levels of Rule Novelty (Model (3)), and are less likely to be a Highly Novel Rule (Model (4)).
The bottom half of Table 1 indicates that the regulatory novelty of securities rules displays high levels of vari-
ation. In the aftermath of both the GFC and the Asian Financial Crisis, new rules’ regulatory novelty is not espe-
cially high nor low. The post-GFC variable is statistically insignificant in both Models (5) and (6), indicating that
securities rules written in the years 2008 through 2011 display levels of Rule Novelty and rates of Highly Novel
Rule that are neither especially high nor especially low as compared to the set of securities rules written through
2007. Moreover, the post-GFC coefficient estimates are negative. This indicates that data slightly trends toward
relatively lower levels of novelty, rather than the expectation that a major crisis would lead to higher novelty.
Similarly to Models (5) and (6), the post-AFC variable in Models (7) and (8) is statistically insignificant, indicat-
ing that levels of Rule Novelty, and the likelihood of Highly Novel Rule, for securities rules written between 1998
and 2001 are neither especially high nor low as compared to the set of securities rules written through 1997.
Together, the novelty in securities rules shows high levels of variation and does not display the expected trend
toward regulatory novelty in the aftermath of major crises.
The estimated effect magnitude is plotted in Figure 4, which displays predicted probabilities for the Highly
Novel Rule regressions (Table 1, Models (2), (4) (6), and (8)).13 Holding other variables at their sample means,
the expected probability that a new banking rule written in the aftermath of the GFC is highly novel is 42%, up
from 14% prior to the GFC (top left graph). In contrast, the top right graph shows that bank rules in the after-
math of the Asian Financial crisis were much less likely to be highly novel (3% likelihood from 1998 through
2001, as compared to 25% prior to 1998). Securities rules (bottom graphs) do not change much from pre- to
post-crisis periods. The bottom-left graph shows a slight decrease in the expected probability of highly novel
securities rules written after the GFC (from 13% prior to 2008 to 10% between 2008 and 2011). The bottom right
graph shows the expected probability of a highly novel securities rule slightly increases from 4% prior to 1997 to
5% between 1998 and 2001.
Figure 5 summarizes the overall empirical findings. For international bank rules, we find an increase in regu-
latory novelty for rules written just after the GFC (Table 1, Models (1) and (2)), but a decrease in regulatory nov-
elty for rules written just after the AFC (Table 1. In the securities rules, we find high variation in regulatory
novelty and no clear trend in either the post-GFC or post-AFC periods (Table 1, Models (5) through (8)). We
next discuss robustness checks and the broader significance of these findings.
4.3. Robustness checks
These findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications and operationalizations. First, the choice of
beta regression does not drive statistical results. An alternative to beta regression, a log-transformed dependent
variable regressed in an OLS model, exhibits identical estimate signs, and statistical significance (Table B1). In
addition, findings are not driven by the choice of a post-crisis period of 4 years; post-crisis periods as short as
3 years (1998–2001, and 2008–2011) and as long as nine years (1998–2006, and 2008–2016) lead to similar find-
ings (Tables B1 and B2, respectively). For international securities rules for the 9-year post-crisis period, the esti-
mated coefficient for the post-GFC period becomes positive (flips signs) but remains statistically insignificant; all
other post-crisis indicators retain the estimated sign and statistical significance at less than 10% confidence. One
could argue that the post-GFC period should begin in 2009 rather than 2008; using an alternative GFC start date
of 2009 maintains especially novel bank rules and high variation in the novelty of securities rules (Table B2). The
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estimated coefficient for the post-GFC securities rules becomes positive (flips signs) but remains statistically insig-
nificant. Finally, including co-authored documents in the baseline sample does not drive the key results; exclud-
ing these observations from the sample leads to consistent estimate signs and statistical significance (Table B3).
Together, we have confidence in the statistical findings.
4.4. Discussion
We theoretically expected post-crisis periods to be moments when international standard-setting bodies adopt
novel regulatory approaches. Our empirical results (summarized in Figure 5) surprisingly found that only
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international bank rules in the aftermath of the GFC exhibit the expected trend. While, the existing literature has
largely focused on the 2010 Basel III international standard, which revised the 2004 Basel II agreement as to the
linchpin of the post-GFC international rules (Admati & Hellwig 2013), our results suggest that the broader range
of BCBS’s post-GFC rules as a whole deviated to a greater extent from existing rules compared to the standards
designed by the same body in previous periods.
While the BCBS’s post-GFC rules are consistent with expectations that post-crisis periods are moments when
regulatory organizations are likely to write novel rules, the response of the same standard-setter to AFC does not.
Instead, we find a decrease in regulatory novelty for rules written just after the AFC. While the existing literature
emphasizes the many regulatory innovations associated with Basel II renegotiation (Lall 2012), international bank
standards written during this period as a whole display especially low levels of a regulatory novelty than those
negotiated before the crisis, suggesting that bank regulators during this period largely built upon existing rules’
scopes and approaches.
What explains these findings? In this concluding section points toward different ways in which these results
support or challenge the insights coming from existing literature regarding the determinants of regulatory change
in international finance.
First, our empirical analysis has shown that there is variation in the level of regulatory novelty associated with
different crises. From a political economy perspective, the origin, severity, and type of crises will shape the incen-
tives faced by policymakers in different countries to promote or oppose broad regulatory change (Simmons 2001;
Drezner 2007; Helleiner 2014). For instance, IPE scholars have theorized that the distribution of market power in
international finance means that crises originating in core countries are more likely to generate international reg-
ulatory cooperation than those originating in the periphery (Simmons 2001). This explanation is consistent with
the lack of an increase in regulatory novelty after the AFC, which originated in emerging markets, thus creating
incentives for core countries that had been affected only indirectly to promote their existing policies onto emerg-
ing markets in order to minimize adjustment costs for their firms (Drezner 2007). On the contrary, the fact that
the GFC originated in the US and engulfed the world’s main financial centers gave incentives to policymakers in
these countries to internationalize the novel rules designed domestically in order to avoid putting their firms at a
disadvantage against foreign competitors (Helleiner 2014).
At the same time, the focus on the origin and nature of the crisis cannot explain the different reactions to
banking and securities regulators to the GFC. The fact that the GFC involved a number of non-bank financial
institutions (including money market funds, repo markets, OTC derivatives counterparties, and securitized
assets), which fall under the remit of securities regulators and only indirectly under bank regulators’ jurisdiction,
suggests that especially high regulatory novelty should be found in international securities rules rather than inter-
national bank rules.
Second, our finding that different international regulatory bodies react differently to the same crisis calls for
greater attention to how the institutional features a regulatory body such as membership, mandate, and internal
structure may mediate its responsiveness to a crisis (Woyames Dreher 2020). For instance, the explicit prudential
mandate to preserve financial stability that is at the core of banking regulation could explain how the rules from
the BCBS displayed greater regulatory novelty after a financial crisis that threatened the stability of global banking
system compared to IOSCO, whose members’ mandate tend to prioritize preserving market integrity and
protecting investors.
Moreover, since decisions within international standard-setting bodies such as the BCBS and IOSCO are
taken by consensus, the scope and composition of the membership can be expected to influence the capacity of
organizations to deviate from the status quo and the approach taken (Moschella & Tsingou 2013). The lack of
statistical effect for international securities after both financial crises could reflect the relatively large membership
of IOSCO and its wide-ranging regulatory issues; with a large membership and many issues, it may be difficult to
observe statistically significant average data trends in regulatory novelty. However, statistical findings persist
when controlling for rules written by specific IOSCO committees (e.g. Technical Group, Emerging Markets
Group) and when dropping the rules written by the Emerging Markets Committee, which might address a differ-
ent set of issues than the other rules (Table B4). Within international bank rules, the BCBS expanded its member-
ship in 2009 to all G20 countries; theoretically, the changing composition of regulators comprising the BCBS
could change modal member preferences, resulting in new ideal point policies (Downs et al. 1998) that are
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expressed as novel regulations. In practice, however, existing studies suggest that officials from the original BCBS
members drove the post-crisis BCBS agenda, with only limited input from new BCBS members (Walter 2016).
This point highlights the importance of looking beyond the formal institutional characteristics of regulatory
agencies. Different studies have theorized how the process of setting international standards in finance is
influenced by informal characteristics of the individuals that populate these bodies, such as regulators’ shared
mindsets, technical training, and normative orientations shaping (Porter 2003; Mügge 2011; Moschella &
Tsingou 2013; Seabrooke & Tsingou 2014; Tsingou 2015). As a result, while financial crises may trigger new regu-
latory initiatives, continuity in the internal operation of the standard-setting process is likely to bias regulatory
change toward incremental adjustments upon the existing rules (Helleiner 2012; Moschella & Tsingou 2013).
From this perspective, our findings concerning the higher novelty associated with banking standards after the
GFC provide some support for the notion that the Basel Committee has witnessed from 2008 onwards a rapid
ideational shift driven by “an insiders’ coup d’état” (Baker 2013), which have promoted new ideas and approaches
such as the rise to prominence of macroprudential ideas.
While a more complete theoretical explanation of what factors mediate the impact of crises on regulatory
novelty remains outside the scope of the paper, in the conclusion we suggest a few potential pathways for scholars
to test these approaches more systematically by building upon the data and approach outlined in this paper.
5. Conclusion
Although financial crises are most likely moments when financial regulatory concerns elevate to the top of the
international public policy agenda, much is still unknown about crises’ systemic effects on international financial
regulatory cooperation. This paper provides a unique perspective of the population of international bank and
securities rules with a specific focus on across-time regulatory novelty. Our empirical findings indicate that inter-
national standard-setting bodies often do not write novel regulations during post-crisis moments at an especially
high rate compared to non-crisis moments. This ran counter to theoretical expectations that post-crisis moments
would be characterized by high rates of regulatory novelty. Simultaneously, an important exception is evidence of
high regulatory novelty in international bank rules following the 2008 GFC. This shows that campaigns of many
new rules that display regulatory novelty are possible, even if they should not be taken as given.
This paper provides systematic evidence of financial crises’ impacts on international financial regulatory
change. Two major contributions emerge from this work. First, while existing literature provides many insights
about specific international financial regulatory reforms – often highlighting failures and successes–the collective
character of international financial regulation has remained elusive. This is the first study to assess regulatory
change across the entire population of international standards that have emerged to coordinate financial regula-
tory policies since the 1970s.
Second, this paper incorporates, for the first time, a text as a data approach to understand the evolution of
international financial regulatory policies. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a unique
approach to measuring the regulatory change that can be used within other contexts outside of finance. We join
a growing list of scholars who use text as a new source of data and insights into areas of international political
economy as varied as bilateral investment treaties (Arel-Bundock & Lechner 2018), preferential trade agreements
(Allee & Lugg 2016), and central bank preferences (Baerg & Lowe 2020).
This paper complements existing case-based analyses of international financial regulatory reform by providing
the broad context – the full population of international rules – within which each case falls. A theoretical expla-
nation to inform the surprising key empirical findings is left for future analyses. In particular, the approach and
data identified in this study provide a potential pathway that future studies could follow to more systematically
test the large set of accumulated theories about the determinants of regulatory change. We suggest here a few
potential avenues. First, while the characteristics of a crisis can be expected to influence the regulatory response,
the focus of our analysis on two crises selected on the basis of their “systemic” nature and the significance for the
literature prevents us from systematically testing this. Further research should build upon our analysis to incorpo-
rate a broader range of crises and other market shocks (e.g. scandals) and investigate their impact across the pop-
ulation or subset of reforms. Second, while our focus on just two standard-setting bodies limits our capacity to
test the impact of different institutional design features over the response of a regulator to the crisis, further
© 2020 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 15
Regulatory novelty after fin. crises S. Pagliari, and M. Wilf
research could probe this by expanding this approach developed in this paper to a broader range of regulatory
bodies, both at the international and domestic level. Third, further work could build upon recent empirical inno-
vations within this literature which has tracked the career histories (Seabrooke & Eleni 2020), educational back-
ground (Chwieroth 2009) and hierarchies (Ban & Patenaude 2019) among the individuals working within
regulatory bodies and explore how these relate to the patterns in regulatory change across the population of
reforms highlighted by our study.
In addition, further research may consider extending this approach to analyze other types of textual evidence
to capture additional dimensions of regulatory change that remain outside of the purview of the paper. For
instance, while our corpus has investigated exclusively the text of existing regulatory standards, a different data
sample that captures other textual sources such as minutes, speeches, journalistic accounts could be the basis for
interesting future research that applies beyond the analysis of the rules on the books. Further work could build
upon our approach and extend it to the work of domestic regulatory agencies to investigate variation in the way
countries respond to crises beyond the focus on a few specific flagship domestic reforms that are common in the
existing literature. Finally, while this paper has focused on the level of novelty in the rules by the same single
standard-setting bodies, further work could expand the population-level type of analysis developed in this paper
to other standard-setting bodies and to investigate the interaction between different regulators.
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Endnotes
1 Throughout the paper, the terms “international regulation”, and regulatory “initiatives”, “rules”, “standards”, and
“reform” are used interchangeably to describe best practice documents that are formally written and published by interna-
tional standard-setting bodies.
2 These are standardized by document and are not affected by document length. In regression analysis, we additionally con-
trol for cleaned document word count.
3 BCBS (https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publications.htm) and IOSCO (https://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=public_
reports).
4 For international banking regulations, these were documents that the BCBS coded as “Standards” or “Guidelines” or
“Sound Practices”; we excluded BCBS publications categorized as: “Implementation reports”, “FAQs”, “Consultative”,
“QIS”, “Working Papers”, “Newsletters” and “Other”. For international securities regulations, standards were the docu-
ments that IOSCO coded as “Final report” type, excluding the “Implementation” category; we excluded IOSCO publica-
tions categorized as: “Consultation report”, “Preliminary report” and “Other”.
5 BCBS was established in 1974, and the first available document is in 1975; IOSCO was established in 1983, and the first
available document is 1989. The baseline statistical analysis runs through 2011, and includes 139 international bank (e.g.
BCBS) rules and 238 international securities (e.g. IOSCO) rules. In robustness checks, a maximum of 183 BCBS rules
between 1978 and 2016 and 302 IOSCO rules between 1989 to 2016 enter into analysis; the earliest observation from
BCBS and IOSCO each fall out of the analysis because there are no previous documents and Maximum Cosine Similarity
is therefore undefined.
6 To provide data transparency, Figure 2 includes cosine similarity between the rule of interest and all rules by the same
regulator; however, as described above, in our measure of novelty, only rules written prior to the rule of interest will ever
enter into selection of Maximum Cosine Similarity.
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7 Though, Basel III is widely acknowledged to introduce new regulatory approaches (such as liquidity and leverage ratio
minimums) to complement existing regulatory approaches (focused on regulatory capital minimums). The new
approaches – liquidity and leverage minimums, among others – are broadly discussed in the 2010 Basel III rule and
detailed within subsequent, separate BCBS rules.
8 The BCBS began as a consultative organization such that there are only six BCBS regulations prior to the onset of the
1982 Latin American debt crisis.
9 An alternative, OLS model using a logit-transformed dependent variable does not change the substantive results.
10 Given the rolling measure, in each corpus (BCBS and IOSCO) we omit the ten earliest observations (which have only a
very small sample against which to determine whether the rule is or is not “highly novel”). For this reason, model esti-
mates of Highly Novel Rule are based on samples with ten fewer observations and later sample start dates.
11 12% of BCBS and 19% of IOSCO rules are coauthored; excluding these documents from the sample does not change sub-
stantive results.
12 Logged values capture the assumption that when many previous documents exist, the marginal effect of one additional
new document is small, but there is a greater overall probability of a similar previous document.
13 Estimated effect magnitudes for Rule Novelty regressions (Table 1, Models (1), (3), (5),and (7)) have substantively consis-
tent results and may be found in Appendix B2. We display predicted probabilities in the main text because this is a com-
monly used quantity with an intuitive interpretation.
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